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Abstract: Whereas established democracies have been responding to public pressures for
broader inclusion, grassroots participation as well as public accountability, existing measures
of democracy rely almost exclusively on a liberal conceptualization of representative
democracy. Most notably, they ignore another fundamental tradition of democratic thought:
that of radical democracy, which strives for direct participation of all citizens in the public
debate and in political decision-making. Drawing from classical liberal and radical views on
what democratic institutions can or should accomplish, we construct a multidimensional
measurement instrument which we devise specifically for the subnational level of the Swiss
cantons. The resulting measures point to a dilemma of radical democracy, since participatory
cantons are markedly less inclusive. Liberal democracies in turn are faced with a different
dilemma: Citizens in liberal democracies are significantly less supportive of both their
political institutions and their political community.
1 This paper was written within the framework of the Swiss National Science Foundation’s project
“Demokratiequalität in den Schweizer Kantonen” (project no. 100012-117661) which has been pursued by the
authors under guidance of Prof. Dr. Adrian Vatter and Dr. Marc Bühlmann.
21.	Introduction
With Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices Russell Dalton (2004) has presented a
deep probing analysis of the skepticism of most democratic citizens towards the pillars of
representative democracy and its meaning for the future of democracy. Dalton finds that
political support for politicians, political parties and political institutions has eroded not only
in the U.S. but since the 1980s virtually in all advanced industrial democracies.2 In contrast to
the authors of The Crisis of Democracy (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975) he does
not consider established democracies as fundamentally challenged in their existence. In fact
the “critical citizens” remain highly supportive of the democratic ideal (cf. Norris 1999a).
While lower levels of political support do make governing more difficult, they also fuel
demands for reforming representative democracy, with contemporary publics increasingly
favoring direct democracy and new forms of associative democracy (Dalton 2004, 181–185).
In Democracy Transformed? (Cain, Dalton, and Scarrow 2003) several contributors document
how in the last three decades political elites have responded to these popular pressures by
political reforms, reforms that may lead to a broader inclusion of all affected, increased direct
involvement of citizens and higher public accountability of representatives, possibly
amounting to a fundamental transformation of democracy comparable to the creation of mass
democracy in the early twentieth century. The volume closes with several questions to be
investigated in comparative empirical analysis: Have recent reforms actually led to increased
democratic quality? Are there democratic trade-offs, for instance between direct democracy
and inclusion? And lastly: does ‘more democracy’ actually cure the present ills of
representative democracy, namely the observed low levels of public support?
So far these questions have been addressed only in a speculative way (cf. Warren 2003;
Dalton, Cain, and Scarrow 2003, 256–269). One central reason is that we still lack of
empirical measures of democratic quality which would take these developments into account.
Even if recent measures of democracy aim at assessing the gradual differences in the quality
of established democracies, they have been criticized for relying all to readily on a minimal
concept of liberal democracy, when taking measurement of freedom rights, separation of
powers and competitive elections (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 11; Pickel and Pickel 2006,
2 The diagnosis of eroding confidence in political parties and institutions has been questioned by Pippa Norris
(2011, 73) on behalf of newer data for West European countries from 1998 until 2009. Instead she stresses the
marked and persistent differences of levels between nations, while the fluctuations over time appear to be
trendless (within this time period).
3154; Bühlmann et al. 2008, 116–117). Yet specifying the object of reference – ‘quality of
democracy’ – is a central step for developing a democracy index, as it has far-reaching
consequences on operationalization and results. In fact the meaning of democracy has been
highly debated in the entire history of democratic thought, leading to a tremendous variety of
democratic theories (cf. Held 2006, 1–2; Schmidt 2010, 19–26, 289). Most notably, measures
of democracy have ignored another fundamental tradition of democratic thought: the radical
model of democracy (cf. Held 2006, 4–5). The radical democratic tradition, subsuming
participatory and important deliberative theories, strives for extensive and direct participation
of all people in the formation of the public opinion and in political decision-making (Barber
1984; Young 2000; Warren 2001). It is telling that measures of democratic quality regularly
show implausible values for the Swiss referendum democracy (cf. Bühlmann et al. 2009,
457). Yet it is exactly this radical democratic thinking and its exemplification in the Swiss
type of democracy that have been brought into play in recent constitutional debates and which
lie at the heart of efforts to expand the political opportunities through political reforms (cf.
Dalton 2004, 182).
Another reason is that it may be too early for making definite assessments of these reforms, as
their multiple effects on democratic quality may be visible in the long term only (Dalton,
Cain, and Scarrow 2003, 273; Dalton 2004, 187). Moreover, at the national level new political
opportunities have often been introduced only halfheartedly, as is evident from the moderate
progress with regard to party access to elections (Bowler, Carter, and Farrell 2003) or from
the still restrictive usage of constitutional and legislative referenda (Scarrow 2003). The
transformation of democracy is in effect better visible at subnational levels which in several
countries have gained considerable autonomy, thereby bringing politics nearer to the citizens
(Ansell and Gingrich 2003a). It is also at these levels, where the availability and use of
constitutional and legislative referenda have increased the most – when considering the
regional level this is primarily the case in Germany, Australia, the U.S. and Switzerland
(Scarrow 2003, 49, 51; for Germany see Eder and Magin 2008).
We thus agree with the editors of Democracy Transformed? that minimalist definitions of
democracy in the line of Joseph Schumpeter (1976 [1942]) – reducing the role of the citizens
to produce a government by means of competitive elections – are insufficient for assessing the
potential democratic transformations towards the ideals of participatory and associative
democracy (Dalton, Cain, and Scarrow 2003, 256). We also share the conviction with Mark
Warren (2003, 246) that “[i]t is possible in principle to develop multi-dimensional
4assessments that connect the basic and still radical meaning of democracy as collective self-
government to the highly complex forms emerging within the OECD countries.” What we
propose is, however, to concentrate the efforts for such an ambitious undertaking to the
subnational level, the place where democratic transformation is conceivably gaining its
strongest momentum. Moreover, the need for developing such measures specifically for the
subnational level becomes evident when simply applying existing democracy indices to the
subnational level, as the resulting measures seem highly implausible (cf. Bühlmann et al.
2009).3
In this paper we therefore construct an exemplary measurement instrument which we devise
specifically for the case of the subnational level of the Swiss cantons. We believe that the
Swiss cantons make for an ideal test field for a first subnational measurement instrument
which is to account for liberal and radical views of democracy alike. The cantons of the Swiss
federal state constitute distinct democracies with a long standing tradition of direct
democracy, combined with a vibrant associational life and encompassing government
coalitions (Vatter 2002; Freitag 2004). Besides, the tension between the liberal emphasis on
representation and the radical preference for direct democracy is well in line with our guiding
hypothesis. We hypothesize that this tension is meaningful in the context of the Swiss cantons
in two ways, On the one hand for the historical and cultural contrast between the Latin and the
German speaking cantons (cf. Kriesi and Wisler 1996; Stutzer 1999; Trechsel 2000, 23;
Vatter 2002, 271, 319, 350, 418) and on the other hand for the antagonism present – by
definition – in the institutions of every semi-direct democracy and thus of every Swiss canton.
We base our measurement concept on three central dimensions of democracy for each
tradition. These dimensions are distilled from liberal and radical democratic theory
respectively in sections 2 and 3. For each dimension we also deduce the related components
which in turn are composed of several subcomponents. In section 4 we bring these liberal and
radical dimensions together into a multidimensional measurement instrument of democratic
qualities. In section 5 we present the resulting measures for the Swiss cantons. Section 6 is
devoted to the question whether ‘more democracy’ does in fact induce higher levels of
political support. A short conclusion is offered in section 7.
3 Sabine Kropp et al. (2008) have applied Tatu Vanhanen’s Index of Democratization to the German Länder and
the Swiss cantons. Even if the index provides for (clearly arbitrary) additional points for referenda, several more
participatory cantons even fail to reach a democratic minimum and appear as autocracies instead.
52.	The	Liberal	Model	of	Democracy
The liberal model of democracy pursued here traces the tradition of protective4 liberal
democracy: We start with the liberal constitutionalism of Locke, go on to the separation of
powers of Montesquieu and Madison, and end with direct responsibility of government
towards the electors following Bentham, James Mill and John Stuart Mill. These three
dimensions have become the central tenets of theoretical and empirical research on
democracy. The liberal constitutionalism is being studied in terms of freedom rights and
aspects of the rule of law; with regard to the separation of powers, horizontal accountability is
the central object of reference; and the control of representatives by voters is being discussed
under the topic of electoral accountability. In the next three sections we will anchor these
three dimensions in the liberal theory of democracy and briefly elaborate on the components
of each dimension.
2.1. Liberal Constitutionalism
A starting point of the liberal tradition of democracy can be located in the concept of
constitutionalism developed by Locke (1963 [1689]), meaning that state powers need to be
legally circumscribed in order to secure individual freedom. In the following, we briefly
describe the concepts of individual freedom and rule of law.
Individual Freedom. Throughout the liberal tradition of democracy we find calls for a whole
set of individual freedom rights. In his contractual theory, Locke (1963 [1689]) emanated
from a natural right to life, liberty and estate. Bentham (1960 [1776]; 1843 [1831]) and James
Mill (1937 [1820]) justified freedoms of speech, press and association as remedy for
corruption, whereas John Stuart Mill (1982 [1859]) stressed the right to an individual concept
of life. Freedom rights, however, need not only be formally adopted but also effectively
warranted (Beetham 2004). Freedom rights can only be secured to the extent that the rights
and rules of democratic decision-making are also followed and respected by the individual
citizens. Individual freedom also entails the liberal claim for a limited scope of the state.
Bentham (1960 [1776]) and James Mill (1937 [1820]) provided for the classical liberal
argument for the restriction of state regulation: Free transactions among self-interested
individuals promote the utility of all citizens best.
4 For the purpose of a clearer distinction from the radical model of democracy, we do not draw on the theoretical
stream of “developmental liberal democracy” which understands democracy as a school for promoting
individual civic competences (for this distinction cf. Held 2006).
6Rule of Law. Locke insisted on legal commitment of the authority, because “where law ends,
tyranny begins” (1963 [1689], chap. 18). Montesquieu (1994 [1748]) pleaded for a positive
system of laws setting inviolable limits to state action in order to depersonalize the state’s
power structure and to limit arbitrariness and corruption. By making reference to inviolable
natural laws, Locke and Montesquieu not only implied a formal, but also a substantive
supremacy of the law. In liberal democracies, human rights and basic freedom rights are
inviolable and must be put out of reach of majority decisions (O’Donnell 2004; Morlino
2004). Otherwise, democracies could turn into “tyrannies of the majority” (Tocqueville 2006
[1835]). Montesquieu (1994 [1748]) further introduced the principle of equality before the
law into democratic theory. Rule of law demands equal access to the courts and equal
treatment by the law (Beetham 2004).
2.2. Horizontal Accountability
Early on, conceptions of liberal democracy have been coupled to the idea of separation of
powers in order to control the government and to ensure that the latter actually sticks to the
rules of liberal constitutionalism. Contemporary research on democracy discusses these issues
under the notion of horizontal accountability, thereby referring to a “network of relatively
autonomous powers (i.e. other institutions) that can call into question, and eventually punish,
improper ways of discharging the responsibilities of a given official” (O’Donnell 1994, 61).
Accountability encompasses aspects of information, justification and sanction (Schedler 1999,
14-18).
Checks and Balances. According to Locke (1963 [1689]), only the separation of power
between the executive and the legislative branch can secure the subordination of both powers
to the law and avoid that they pursue own interests. Montesquieu (1994 [1748]) argued for a
mixed constitution coupling the monarchic government to an institutional system, where
constitutional powers must dispose of differing legal competences. These ‘checks and
balances’ later formed a core piece in the Federalist Papers (Hamilton et al. 1788, Art. 47-51).
Contemporary research on democracy stresses the need to restrain the executive power
through a strong parliament (Beetham and Boyle 1995, 66-74) and a strong opposition
(Altman and Pérez-Liñan 2002).
Judicial Independence. According to Montesquieu (1994 [1748], book XI, chap. 6), an
independent judiciary is even more important for securing individual rights and preventing
repression. Madison (Hamilton et al. 1788, Art. 47-51) called for a professional, politically
independent court, deeming elections of judges and term limits to be inappropriate.
7Independent Controlling Instances. The abuse of government power may be further
contained if rule-making itself becomes the object of judiciary revision, in terms of a
constitutional review (Hayek 1960). Furthermore, in order to prevent corruption and
arbitrariness, the administration needs to be controlled through an independent administrative
court. Other instances are audit agencies, counter corruption commissions, or an ombudsman
(Diamond and Morlino 2005, xxi). Such agencies of protection are intended to secure
individual freedoms of the citizens against the abuse of power (Beetham 2004, 68, 71).
2.3. Electoral Accountability
For Locke (1963 [1689], 308, 395), the state was a legal creation agreed on by the people,
who conferred authority to the government for the purpose of pursuing the ends of the
governed. According to Madison (Hamilton et al. 1788, no. 10), representation prevents the
threat of a tyranny of the majority emanating from direct democracy: While people are driven
by passions, representative institutions are the place for competent deliberation. The notion
that government needs to be held directly accountable to the electorate was then introduced
by the utilitarians. Secret and competitive elections are to ensure responsive law-making in
order to maximize the public good (Bentham 1843 [1831], 47). Modern research on
democracy treats this aspect of representation under the term of electoral accountability,
understood as relations of accountability between rulers and voters (O’Donnell 2004).5
Periodic Free Elections by Secret Ballot. Periodic elections are understood as a sanctioning
mechanism leading rational representatives to take the will of the electorate into account in
order to be reelected. Secret ballot is required if electoral preferences are to be expressed
without compulsion and fear (Dahl 1998; Beetham 2004).
Competition. Bartolini (1999; 2000) distinguishes several dimensions of electoral competition
necessary for democratic accountability. By definition, democratic elections call for the
dimension of contestability, that is, the real possibility to enter the race with other
participants. Second, the electoral vulnerability of incumbents makes the threat of potential
electoral sanctions more effective. Arguably, a party, a coalition, or an incumbent feels
5 Newer concepts of representation encompass descriptive representation and responsiveness (Pitkin 1972). We
consider descriptive representation rather as a radical concern and treat it in section 3.3. Responsiveness,
understood as disposition of the political system to act according to the wishes of the citizens, can be regarded
as an outcome dimension of democratic quality (Diamond and Morlino 2004; 2005). As our democracy
measures focus not on outcomes, but on the preceding democratic structures and processes, we do not directly
account for responsiveness (cf. Bühlmann, Merkel, and Weßels 2008, 7; Lauth 2004, 25).
8vulnerable to the extent that the last/preceding race was close. The threat to the incumbents
also depends on the importance of the offer, i.e. the weight of an alternative party or coalition
(cf. Altman and Pérez-Liñán 2002). A further dimension is electoral availability, i.e. the basic
willingness of a voter to eventually modify her or his party choice.
Clarity of Responsibility. The evaluation of the incumbent government by the voters requires
a clear attribution of responsibilities. Clarity of responsibility is undermined if the political
system is characterized by a lack of voting cohesion within the governing party or by
coalitions consisting of numerous parties (Powell and Whitten 1993, 399-400).
Relative Governmental Autonomy. Although relations of accountability between rulers and
voters involve elections as sanctioning measure, they also presuppose a relative governmental
autonomy once a government has been elected. In addition to the autonomy of the elected
representatives from illegitimate interests (cf. Merkel 2004) and from other state levels,
responsible government also involves independence from voters between elections (Pitkin
1972).
3.	The	Radical	Model	of	Democracy
The most important theoretical foundations of the radical model of democracy are the
participatory and some of the deliberative theories of democracy, as they have been subsumed
under the term of “radical democracy” by Cohen and Fung (2004).6 However, predecessors of
radical theories of democracy reach as far back as to the assembly democracy of ancient
Athens, to Rousseau’s republicanism and to (neo-)Marxist theories of democracy (cf. Held
2006, 5, 187). Within the radical tradition, too, three central dimensions of democracy can be
discerned: radical participation, public accountability, and inclusion.
3.1. Radical Participation
From a radical democratic point of view, the citizens’ active involvement in politics and in the
public life in general is crucial for the unfolding of their civic virtues and for their self-
realization. Their individual political participation, thus, is valued for its own sake and even
constitutes the main justification for a democratic system (Pateman 1970, 25, 43; see also
Barber 1984, 117-162, 232; Macpherson 1977, 114-115). Radical theorists expect that the
more competences and opportunities for serious involvement the citizens are granted, the
6 Fuchs (2007) and Schmidt (2010, 236-253) also describe participatory and deliberative theories as different
branches of one common theoretical stream. See also Saward (2001) and Fung (2006).
9more they will actually make use of them and participate. Hence the demands to
institutionalize opportunities to participate which are as encompassing and diverse as possible
(Pateman 1970; Barber 1984, 272).
Extended Electoral Rights for the Citizens. While radical democrats are skeptical towards the
delegation of decision-making powers away from the citizens to representative bodies
(Rousseau 1762, 235-239; Barber 1984, 145-147), they generally do acknowledge that a
system of pure direct-democratic self-rule would be above the capacity of the citizens – hence
the need for some delegation (e.g. Barber 1984, 267). In such cases, the citizens shall at least
retain extensive powers to control and possibly sanction their delegates. Thus, members not
only of the legislative, but also of the executive and of judicial bodies shall be elected in
direct popular elections. To prevent those delegates from acting against the citizens’ will, the
latter shall be granted rights to recall the former from office ahead of schedule.
Citizens’ Rights to Directly Decide on Issues. However, radical democrats maintain that the
citizens need instruments to control the decisions on concrete issues directly, in a
differentiated manner, and between elections; they must be conferred direct democratic rights
to revise decisions by their delegates, and to set new topics on the agenda (Barber 1984, 281-
289). It is only by this kind of direct participation that individuals turn into citizens (Barber
1984, 232) and a political system into a participatory democracy (Macpherson 1977, 112);
only direct participation entails the immediate self-rule and the sovereignty of the people (cf.
also Rousseau 1762). In addition to the most basic rights of popular initiative and popular
referendum, more refined direct-democratic rights are also postulated.
Utilization of Direct-Democratic Rights. No matter how extensive the formal rights to direct
participation in a democracy are, most of their value depends on the extent to which they are
made use of. The participatory benefits of individual self-realization and of collective self-rule
are supposedly realized to the extent that popular votes are actually held with some regularity.
Local Self-Rule. Real self-rule is most meaningful and can best be achieved in the domains
on which individual citizens can exert the most direct influence and which concern them most
directly: in their most proximate environment (Macpherson 1977, 108; Barber 1984, 267-
273). That is why the extent of constitutional, fiscal and perceived autonomy of the local
municipalities is seen to be of particular importance.
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3.2. Public Accountability
From a radical point of view, the liberal instruments of horizontal and electoral accountability
alone are not sufficient for ensuring maximal accountability and responsiveness of the
representatives to the citizens; they have to be complemented by mechanisms of public
accountability. Informal forms of participation and public discourse enable the society to
continuously bring a broad specter of concerns into the political process, and to exert control
and pressure on those governing (cf. Young 2000, 153, 173-177; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti
2000, 149, 151; Lauth 2004). Public accountability as conceptualized here also comprehends
requirements needed to ensure that the citizens may exercise direct participatory rights in a
thoughtful way.7
Transparency of Political Processes. One aspect which is central to the accountability of the
rulers is the availability of information on the processes in the governmental institutions. The
more transparent the debates and decisions in the parliament, the executive, and the courts are
and the more actively the governmental institutions communicate about their activities, the
better they fulfill their accountability duties toward the public and the more they facilitate a
serious both-way discourse with the citizenry (cf. Beetham 1994, 37; Diamond and Morlino
2004; Schmitter 2005).
Media. The public debate which is an essential part of functioning public accountability
mechanisms, however, involves not only the relations between government and citizens, but
also those among citizens themselves. Independent and diversified media provide an arena for
public debate which allows as multifaceted voices as possible to be expressed and which
avoids the exclusion of potential participants (cf. Cohen 1989, 22-23; Voltmer 2000).
Additionally, the media may assume an own accountability function as ‘watchdogs’ or ‘fourth
estate’ critically evaluating the actions of decision-makers (cf. Peruzzotti and Smulovitz
2006). The circumstances under which the media operate and the importance a democracy
assigns to vivid media are, among else, mirrored by the media rights, such as the prohibition
of censorship or the duty of the state to facilitate information diversity (cf. Beetham 1994,
39). However, the extent to which citizens effectively benefit from diverse media ultimately
depends on the extent of their media use.
7 In the view of some deliberative theorists (e.g. Fishkin 1991; Offe and Preuss 1991), direct participatory rights
for the citizenry may even be counterproductive, if they do not come along with an arena for sufficient
information, reflection, and deliberation.
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Extra-institutional Participation. Even though extra-institutional forms, such as
demonstrations or strikes, in contrast to institutional participation, lack a legally defined
sanctioning power, they are “far from ‘toothless’” in making manifest the preferences of the
citizenry and holding those governing accountable (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000, 151-152;
Young 2001). Such forms of participation can unfold their power more unhamperedly if their
free use is granted constitutional protection. But extra-institutional participation also
materializes in a broader participative culture which is rooted in the individual citizens and in
the civil society and the importance of which has often been stressed by radical democrats
(Pateman 1970; Macpherson 1977, 98-114; Barber 1984, 264-266; cf. also Merkel 2004, 46-
47). The higher the proportions of politically alert and interested citizens (cf. Fishkin 1991)
and of members in civil society organizations are, the richer the public debate and the stronger
the pressure on the representatives to act in an accountable way (Beetham 1994, 29-30;
Young 2000, 153; Diamond and Morlino 2004, 25; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006, 10-12).
3.3. Inclusion
Another central claim of radical democratic theories is the extension of the demos (Schmidt
2010, 236-241). Each person concerned by a future decision is regarded as equally qualified
and legitimate to participate in the making of this decision (cf. Rousseau 1762; Barber 1984,
225-229; Dahl 1998, 62-78). The differences between the individuals and groups of a society
are not regarded as a point against political equality and inclusion, but, on the contrary, as
diversity which benefits a rich public discourse and thereby the rationality of decisions
(Dryzek 1990, 41-42; Young 2000, 81-120). Inclusion, in this view, enhances both the quality
and the legitimacy of political decisions.
Equal Political Involvement. As the radical democratic claim for inclusion essentially rests
on the assumption that all humans are fundamentally equal, it implies not only that those
affected by a decision shall be included (cf. Goodin 2007), but that they shall all be equally
included, no matter what their background is (Young 2000, 11; Cohen 1989, 22-23). Equal
involvement certainly presupposes the broad assignment of equal political rights with the
universal right to vote at its heart (cf. Wollstonecraft 2004 [1792]; Marx 1949 [1871]; Paxton
et al. 2003). Beyond the formal assignment of equal political rights, radical democratic
authors attach importance to the degree that equal participation independent from status or
gender is effectively achieved (cf. Smith 2009, 20-22). Equal political involvement is
facilitated if the state provides its citizens with a minimal amount of resources which allows
12
all of them to engage in independent political activity. This embraces both material and
immaterial resources such as civic education (cf. Barber 1984; Dahl 1998, 79-80).8
Inclusive Representation. To the extent that delegation of powers from citizens to elected
bodies is necessary, inclusion also embraces the broad representation of different political and
social groups in those bodies (e.g. Young 2000, 152). To begin with, this means that the
representative organs should mirror the whole diversity of party preferences present in a
society. In the context of the Swiss cantons, the unbiased representation of parties in
parliament and the inclusiveness of the governing coalitions can be assessed. Besides, radical
democrats also call for representation of the different population groups as defined by social
criteria. They do so for essentially three9 reasons: First, the representation of social groups
hints at the extent to which the democratic principle of political equality is actually realized in
a society. Second, the inclusion even of marginal groups is seen as enriching the political
discourse and enhancing the “social knowledge” of a representative body (Young 2000).
Third, if the representatives come from all sections of the population, this may lower the
barriers for the communication of the citizens with them and thus enhance the receptiveness
of the governmental institutions (Arato 2006). Institutionally, an inclusive representation is
furthered by an electoral system favorable to minorities which, by a proportional design,
raises low hurdles for minor groups to be elected (cf. Lijphart 2004; Arato 2006).
4.	A	Multidimensional	Measurement	Instrument
In the preceding sections, we deduced six dimensions of democracy from liberal and radical
theories of democracy, respectively, and further concretized them in several components and
subcomponents. Table 1 gives an overview of the dimensions with their components and
subcomponents. In this section, we will sketch how we bring together these six dimensions
into a measurement instrument for the quality of democracy.
8 What we are looking at here is not the equal distribution of resources, but only at whether all citizens are
entitled to some minimal amount of publicly founded resources which can be regarded as necessary for
engaging in independent political activity in the context of radical democratic theory (Rousseau 1762, 124-
125; Pateman 1970, 22; cf. also Merkel 2004, 44-45).
9 Our conceptualization of the radical model of democracy does, in contrast, not adopt an argument which is put
forth particularly by (neo-)Marxists and which holds that features like gender or education largely determine an
individuals’ political preferences (e.g., Marx 1949 [1871]; cf. also Young 2000, 87-89, 147-148).
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Table 1. Dimensions, components and subcomponents of the multidimensional measurement instrument
Liberal
dimensions Components Subcomponents
Radical
dimensions Components Subcomponents
Liberal
constitutio-
nalism
Individual
freedom
Freedom rights
Radical
participation
Extended electoral
rights
Electoral rights
Property rights Recall rights
Respect for rights and rules Direct-democratic
rights
Basic rights of popular initiative and popular referendum
Limited scope of the state More refined direct-democratic rights
Rule of law
Supremacy of the law Use of direct-democratic rights Frequent direct-democratic votes
Equality before the law
Local self-rule
Financial and perceived local autonomy
Protection of minorities Constitutional local autonomy
Horizontal
accountability
Strength of
parliament
versus
government
Independence
Public
accountability
Transparency of
political processes
Transparency of parliament and communication by
authoritiesSupervisory rights
Legislative competencies
Transparency of government and courts
Power sharing
in parliament
Power sharing regulations
Strength of opposition in parliament
Media
Media rights
Judicial
independence
Separation from government and parliament
Media diversity
Personal independence
Professionalization Media use
Organizational independence
Extra-institutional
participation
Constitutional protection of extra-institutional participation
rights
Independent
controlling
instances
Administrative jurisdiction
Constitutional review
Participative culture
Agencies of protection
Electoral
accountability
Free elections Periodic free elections by secret ballot
Inclusion
Equal political
involvement
Universal and equal right to voteElectoral
vulnerability of
incumbents
Electoral vulnerability in government
Electoral vulnerability in parliament Equal participation
Electoral
availability Willingness of modifying a party choice Minimal amount of resources
Clarity of
responsibility Government responsibility is clearly attributable
Inclusive
representation
Electoral system favorable to minorities
Relative
governmental
autonomy
Independence from the people between elections Representation of parties in parliament
Independence from specific interests Inclusiveness of the governing coalitions
Autonomy  from other state levels Proportional representation of socio-structural groups
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Conceptualization. The conceptualization of the quality of democracy we propose is
innovative in that it takes into account the dimensions of the radical democratic tradition
along with the established liberal dimensions. By basing the concept on a number of different
dimensions, we obtain a multidimensional measurement instrument and thus follow a
methodological suggestion by Pickel and Pickel (Pickel and Pickel 2006, 269; see also
Bühlmann et al. 2008; Bühlmann, Merkel, and Weßels 2008). Our approach enables us to
capture the qualities of pronouncedly liberal and radical democracies in a differentiated way.
We understand the six dimensions as abstract democratic functions. The latter may be realized
by concrete, formal and informal institutional arrangements which are fit to their respective
cultural and political context.10 These institutions appear on the lower levels of the
measurement instrument. The structuring of the dimensions into components and
subcomponents makes this instrument hierarchical. By consistently and successively deducing
each subunit from its respective upper level from the very stage of conceptualization, we
accommodate the methodological critique on existent measures of democracy; furthermore,
the dangers of redundancy and conflation were avoided by defining the components and
subcomponents in a mutually exclusive way (cf. Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 12-14).
Measurement. While the subcomponents are much more concrete than the overarching
dimensions, we still regard them as ‘latent variables’ (cp. Bollen 1989, chap. 6; Treier and
Jackman 2008) to be approximated by multiple indicators. Actual measurement was thus
achieved by operationalizing each subcomponent trough a number of quantifiable indicators
(see Appendix for a list of all indicators used). In order to capture the fine variations in the
quality of the single dimensions of democracy, not only formal institutions (‘rules in form’)
were recorded, but also less formalized structural characteristics (‘rules in use’) of the
cantonal democracies. In this context, it is important to note that there is some inherent trade-
off between the two scientific objectives of differentiation and of parsimony. In our view, the
goal to assess differences in the democratic qualities of well-established, culturally relatively
close subnational democracies requires a rather fine-grained and complex instrument which
also assesses to which degree and in which manner formal democratic institutions actually
work in a given context (Bühlmann et al. 2008, 117; Bühlmann et al. 2009, 459).
10 We draw on the functional research strategy which Lauth (2004) suggests for intercultural comparisons of
democracies: universal democratic functions may be realized by diverse, context-specific “functional
equivalents”.
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Our approach can be exemplified by our operationalization of the dimension of public
accountability for the context of the Swiss cantons: the respective indicators include the legal
enactment of the general rule that any governmental documents are freely accessible to the
public and the legal rules on information duties for the public authorities, but also an indicator
measuring the extent to which the sessions of the executive, the legislative and the judiciary
bodies are actually open to the public. The media system’s contribution to a high-quality
public accountability is measured, first, by the number and the spread of regional and local
newspapers edited in a given canton and in a given year (media diversity); second, survey
data are used to determine the cantonal levels of media use by the citizens; finally, an analysis
of the relevant legal texts was conducted to measure the legal provisions for promoting
information diversity and citizens’ access to the media. The third component in the dimension
of public accountability, i.e. extra-institutional participation, was assessed based on the
constitutional guarantees of freedoms to demonstrate and to strike, and on survey data
reporting citizens’ membership rates in civil society organizations or their interest in politics.
These examples highlight that we relied on data of various kinds and from various sources
(e.g., survey data and legal provisions). Such source variety, in our view, strengthens the
validity of the results by reducing the danger of a systematic measurement bias (Munck and
Verkuilen 2002, 15-16; Lauth 2004, 306-307). The same is true for the relatively high number
of indicators: a total of 178 indicators have finally been included in our measurement
instrument, thus ensuring that each subcomponent is measured by at least two indicators (see
Appendix). Initially, even 371 indicators were assigned to the theoretically derived
subcomponents and then scrutinized for dimensionalities by factor analysis. As could be
expected, not all indicators within the same subcomponent actually loaded on the same factor.
Particularly, proxy indicators relying on constitutional declarations often contrasted with
indicators capturing ‘rules in use’. Due to the bias in data availability, it would be insensitive
to rely on the factor on which the highest number of indicators loads. Instead, we pre-assessed
the validity and reliability of the indicators based on qualitative considerations. Indicators
gained from a more thorough and more encompassing analysis of laws and practices were put
at the center of the validation process, while indicators of more peripheral or symbolic nature
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were removed if necessary. In this way, 48 subcomponents were operationalized by a total of
178 indicators by calculating the respective factor-scores.11
It goes without saying that collecting the relevant data for this number of indicators required a
large effort, all the more so because our data-set was constructed to cover all 26 cantons on a
year-wise basis for 1979-2009. Partly, time series data could be drawn from secondary
sources, but for many indicators primary data had to be collected. Coding of the primary data
was conducted by defining exclusive coding categories. Where appropriate, dichotomous
coding of indicators was avoided since even constitutional and legal provisions often exhibit
gradual variation beyond the distinction ‘absent vs. present’ (cf. also Lauth 2004, 306).
Despite our efforts, it was not possible to find suitable data for all years of the research period.
In these cases, we filled the gaps in the time series with extra- and interpolated data which we
generated in two alternative ways: either we assigned the value documented for one year to
the preceding and/or following years as well, thus creating periods with a constant value each;
for other indicators, we relied on linear inter- and/or extrapolation, thus creating constant
longitudinal trends. The choice which of these two inter-/extrapolation techniques was more
appropriate was guided by careful substantive considerations for each specific indicator.12
Due to limitations in space, we cannot display exact coding details for each indicator in this
paper. However, the detailed codebook and the disaggregate data for each indicator shall be
made accessible online at a later stage; for the time being, they are available from the authors
upon request.
Aggregation. As for the aggregation of the subcomponents towards components and
dimensions of democracy, we relied on our hierarchical theoretical conceptualization of
democratic dimensions. We calculated the democratic measures by averaging the z-
11 We used SPSS and calculated the factor-scores by the regression method based on a principal components
factor analysis. Six of the forty-eight subcomponents were further divided into sub-subcomponents, which then
were treated as the latent variables.
12 Substantive considerations influenced data coding also for a limited number of indicators where the secondary
literature and our case-specific knowledge made us doubt the validity of values gained by schematic
quantitative measurement, mainly for the two small cantons of Appenzell Ausserrhoden and Appenzell
Innerrhoden which are special cases in several respects. For example, party structures are very weakly
institutionalized in Ausserrhoden and Innerrhoden. Therefore, no exact data are available on the parliamentary
seat shares of parties. For measuring electoral competition we took into account not only estimations of the
seat shares of parties but also of professional associations and of non-partisan MPs since the latter two
categories play a distinctive role in the politics of these two cantons.
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standardized subordinated components which implies that each of these components enters
our democratic measures with the same weight, according to our hierarchical set of normative
criteria.13 Moreover averaging supposes additive relationships between democratic
components, where a low score on one component can be made up with a higher score on
another component.14
In the same way the three z-standardized liberal dimensions were averaged into a liberal
index of democratic quality. Such a meta-index facilitates theorizing and testing on liberal
democracy. Theoretically we equally intended aggregating the radical dimensions into a
radical index of democracy. Empirically, however, the next section will show that the Swiss
cantons combine the radical dimensions in quite different ways. Two of the dimensions even
exhibit a negative relationship. Consequently, in the case of the Swiss cantons the radical
dimensions represent the optimal level of aggregation: By considering the liberal index of
democracy along with the radical dimensions of democracy we account for the empirical
multidimensionality of cantonal democracies, while at the same time keeping the number of
democratic measures reasonably small (cp. Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 22-23).15
13 Alternatively we also considered a factorizing aggregation strategy, repeating the procedure described above.
From a democratic theoretical view, however, an unequal weighting of conceptually equivalent appears as
problematic. This is most obvious when single components are excluded entirely as – in the case of the
cantonal years under investigation – they do not load on the same factor. When we subsequently included such
components with their proportional weight, the final results were very similar to the ones arising from the more
transparent and more comprehensible averaging procedure. Whereas we treated the subcomponents as latent
variables which are presumed in the dimension formed by empirically validated indicators, at higher levels of
aggregation we think the theoretical concept tree is better seen as a hierarchical set of normative criteria, which
cannot be validated empirically.
14 A more sophisticated strategy would theoretically deduce differentiated weighting schemes as well as define
aggregation rules based on the theoretical relationships between democratic components (Munck and
Verkuilen 2002, 23-27). While our constructed models of democracy intend to tap central dimensions and
components of liberal and radical conceptions of democracy, it is beyond our ambition to theoretically justify
particular relationships between democratic components, nor would we theoretically ascribe them differential
weights. Lacking in encompassing and precise theories of how elements of liberal and radical democracy
combine and interact, we instead decided to draw on additive aggregation.
15 Depending on the research question at hand one might also want to combine the six dimensions into an overall
index of democratic quality. Such an overall index clearly stands in line with existing broader
conceptualizations of democracy. Diamond and Morlino (2004; 2005), for instance, combine the following
procedural dimensions: Rule of law, participation, competition, vertical accountability, and horizontal
accountability. The aspects of freedom and equality are treated as substantial dimensions; responsiveness is
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In order to facilitate comparisons over space and time, we then standardized all aggregated
democratic measures. Each democracy is located on a scale between zero and one, where zero
denotes the worst practice reported for any cantonal democracy between 1979 and 2009, and
one stands for the best practice ever achieved within this time span.
5.	The	Quality	of	Democracy	in	the	Swiss	Cantons
When applied to the Swiss cantons, the proposed measurement instrument discloses a large
diversity of the cantonal democracies. The variation over space and time is best illustrated by
the following radar charts, depicting the measures for the six aggregated dimensions of
democracy for each of the 26 cantons (figure 1). Within these radar charts the development
over time is indicated by the measurement points for 1979, 1994 and 2009, where we notice a
general increase of democratic qualities in most cantons.16 Several cantons show one-time
leaps with regard to liberal constitutionalism as they had their constitutions totally revised
lately. More incremental were improvements on horizontal accountability, public
accountability and inclusion, reflecting new regulations and political-societal developments.
With regard to electoral accountability we recorded some cantons catching up, while we
observe a slight convergence in terms of radical participation.
While high levels of radical participation is a characteristic feature of the Swiss subnational
democracies, the rising levels of public accountability and inclusion parallel much of the
expected democratic transformations in advanced industrial democracies (Cain, Dalton, and
Scarrow 2003). More peculiar to the subnational referendum democracies of Switzerland is
their profound expansion towards the liberal ideal of democracy in the last three decades. This
is certainly true for the improved horizontal accountability in most Swiss cantons which
reflects international trends favoring judicial independence, administrative jurisdiction,
constitutional review (cf. Cichowski and Stone Sweet 2003) and other protective agencies (i.e.
ombudsman, independent financial control; cf. Ansell and Gingrich 2003b). But also the
numerous constitutional reforms and the enhanced electoral accountability are an expression
of a remarkable democratic transformation taking place at the Swiss subnational level.
denoted as a result-oriented dimension. – See also the Democracy Barometer (Bühlmann, Merkel, and Weßels
2008; www.democracybarometer.org).
16 While this observation is certainly plausible to some extent, it possibly also reflects a certain bias in our
selection of indicators, overstating more recent achievements while underexposing issues debated in past
decades.
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Figure 1. Radar charts for the quality of democracy in the 26 Swiss cantons, 1979, 1994 and 2009
Bern Neuchâtel Vaud
Basel-Landschaft Fribourg Aargau
Solothurn Basel-Stadt Zürich
Schaffhausen Jura Genève
Glarus St. Gallen Ticino
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Figure 1. (Contd.)
Appenzell Ausserrhoden Obwalden Luzern
Zug Valais Thurgau
Nidwalden Graubünden Schwyz
Uri Appenzell Innerrhoden
Legend
LC Liberal constitutionalism RP Radical participation ▬▬▬▬ Status in 1979
HA Horizontal accountability PA Public accountability ▬▬▬▬ Status in 1994
EA Electoral accountability INC Inclusion ▬▬▬▬ Status in 2009
Notes: The origin stands for the lowest value achieved in the corresponding dimension which has ever been
achieved by any canton between 1979 and 2009 (worst practice), the outer end of the axes for the highest ever
achieved value (best practice). The cantons have been arranged according to their index value for liberal
democracy (average of LC, HA, EA) in the year 2009.
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When comparing the Swiss cantons in the cross-section we noticed that several cantons
dispose of relatively high values along all three liberal dimensions, thus disposing of a high
quality index of liberal democracy. In figure 1 we therefore sorted the cantonal democracies
according to their liberal index in the year 2009. In contrast, the radical dimensions are
combined in very different ways – there is no single canton with high values on all three
radical dimensions. Even though radical democrats have often referred to the Swiss
democracy at the subnational level (cf. Rousseau 1762; Barber 1988), we cannot find any
corresponding prototype. Swiss reality further challenges the radical model of democracy as
we find evidence for a democratic trade-off between radical participation and inclusion.
Contrary to the radical critique to liberal democracy it is the more liberal democracies that
prove to be more inclusive, while radical participation even seems to preclude democratic
inclusion (figure 2).
Figure 2. Degree of inclusion in liberal and participatory cantonal democracies, 2009
Notes: The regression lines are all based on significant coefficients (90%-level or higher), regardless of whether
outliers (hollow circles) are considered or not (cp. dashed lines). Outliers were defined by |Dfbeta|>0.392
(Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 1980). For reasons of readability the indices have been multiplied by 100.
Even though the empirical evidence for the Swiss cantons points to a dilemma of radical
democracy, we should not conclude that radical democracy must necessarily remain a
hypothetical construct. We must, however, be cautious of expecting a concurrent expansion of
radical democratic qualities whenever venturing radical democratic reforms. As our analysis
corroborates earlier findings on the exclusionary character of more demanding channels of
participation (Trechsel 1999, 564; Dalton, Cain, and Scarrow 2003, 263), it seems worthwhile
to consider more accessible forms of public debate (televised democracy), less demanding
modes of participation (e-democracy) or more direct forms of representation (deliberative
mini-publics), or a mix thereof (Budge 1996; Fuchs 2007; Warren 2009).
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6.	Political	Support	in	Liberal	and	Radical	Democracies
The creation of mass democracy in the early twentieth century and now the political reforms
in many advanced industrial democracies can be seen as a response of the political elite to a
more critical and more demanding democratic public (Cain, Dalton, and Scarrow 2003). Then
as now are such populist reforms usually guided by the Jeffersonian credo: The cure for the
ills of democracy is more democracy. But does ‘more democracy’ really induce higher levels
of public support?
Liberal democrats would in fact expect quite the contrary. The alleged crisis of the liberal
democratic welfare state, for that matter, was initially seen as a result from an “overload with
participants and demands” (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975, 12; Huntington 1981).
The thesis of ‘overloaded government’ states that growing prosperity has fuelled public
expectations and group demands, leading to an ever growing and ineffective welfare state and
again to further popular pressure – a vicious circle which can be only broken by a firm
political leadership which must respond less to popular demands (Brittan 1975; 1977;
Nordhaus 1975; King 1976; Rose and Peters 1977; cf. Held 2006, 193). An influential leader
of this current of thought was the neo-liberal democrat Friedrich Hayek (cf. Gamble 1996)
who warned from the dynamics of mass democracy and its progressive displacement by the
rule of oppressive state agents (Hayek 1978, 152–162).
Radical democrats in contrast generally embrace the Jeffersonian conviction. Instead of
adhering to the neo-conservative thesis of the overloaded government they have rather
followed the less prominent neo-Marxist thesis of a ‘legitimation crisis’: Citizen interests
were compromised in capitalist democracies, thus requiring radical democratic reforms
(Habermas 1973; Offe 1972). Participatory democrats of this time criticized thin democracy
of the liberal type for alienating the citizens, while only a ‘strong democracy’ of a
participatory type could strengthen citizenship and the political community (Barber 1984,
232). Additionally, radical participation was also seen as enabling “collective decisions to be
more easily accepted by the individual” (Pateman 1970, 27). Radical democratic thought has
also resisted the heralded triumph of liberal democracy after the collapse of soviet
communism (cf. Fukuyama 1989), with deliberative theories in particular moving to the
forefront of scholarly debate. Iris Young (2000, 128) for instance stresses the legitimizing
function of participatory and inclusive-deliberative democracy. And while liberal theories of
political trust seem to concentrate on limiting the risks of trust, Mark Warren (1999) discusses
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deliberative democracy as a potential device for actually cultivating political relations of
‘warranted trust’.
Beyond this theoretical debate between liberal and radical democrats we also find several
empirical comparative studies, arguing that ‘consensus democracy’ leads to higher political
support as it maximizes the number of winners (Lijphart 1999, 286; Norris 1999b; 2011, chap.
10). But the findings from the international comparisons are flawed and are of little help for
assessing how liberal and radical democracy affect political support, as they have lacked
corresponding measures of democracy.
With the measures of liberal and radical qualities of the Swiss cantonal democracies at hand
we are now in the unique position to test the respective claims of liberal and radical democrats
by means of a comparative empirical analysis. Irrespective of the direction of the effects of
liberal and radical qualities of democracy on political support it seems plausible that these two
fundamental traditions of political thought might be of utmost relevance for explaining public
support. Moreover the Swiss subnational laboratory of democracy is particularly well suited
for causal inferences, as the cantons dispose of a large variation in the democratic measures of
interest while moving within the bounds of a common federal constitution and sharing similar
socioeconomic conditions (cf. Przeworski 1970). Even though we have not found full-fledged
radical democracies in Switzerland, the cantonal variation allows us to test the partial effects
of each radical dimension separately.
In our analysis we measure political support with the Selects (2003; 2007) survey items for
institutional trust and community support at the cantonal level. We assume that individual
political support is shaped by an individual’s values and socialization as well as by contextual
cantonal characteristics, notably by the cantons democratic quality. We perform multilevel
analyses, as it allows to reliably estimating individual and contextual effects within the same
model (Snijders and Bosker 1999; Jones 1997). The data structure of the two surveys in 2003
and 2007 is reflected by embedding the individuals (level 1) in their canton (level 2) and these
cantons within the respective year of the survey (level 3).
We proceeded stepwise. Before testing the effects of our democratic measures we specified
individual models of institutional trust and community support (see appendix, table 5). We
then added several indices of political performance and other control variables at the
contextual level (not reported). Only the significant contextual variables were kept for the
subsequent analyses on the effects of our democratic measures. In table 2 we report our
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Table 2. Multilevel models of institutional trust – 25 cantons, 2003 and 2007
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
FIXED PART
Constant 6.406***
(0.118)
6.378***
(0.119)
6.402***
(0.120)
6.404***
(0.119)
6.375***
(0.119)
6.397***
(0.118)
6.385***
(0.119)
6.406***
(0.118)
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL
See coefficients of individual variables in table 5.
CONTEXTUAL LEVEL: CANTON
Democracy measures
Liberal democracy -0.486***
(0.169)
-0.368**
(0.165)
-0.433**
(0.169)
Radical participation -0.371
(0.256)
Public accountability -0.198*
(0.108)
-0.137
(0.095)
Inclusion -0.497***
(0.184)
-0.241
(0.206)
Political performance
Welfare state -0.565***
(0.171)
-0.545***
(0.155)
-0.688***
(0.194)
-0.692***
(0.186)
-0.622***
(0.169)
-0.540***
(0.167)
-0.529***
(0.159)
-0.379*
(0.225)
Latin culture
Share of French or
Italian speaking
-0.508***
(0.083)
-0.527***
(0.075)
-0.580***
(0.114)
-0.475***
(0.090)
-0.482***
(0.080)
-0.430***
(0.084)
-0.452***
(0.080)
-0.496***
(0.080)
Controls
Population size (log) -0.104***
(0.031)
-0.076***
(0.029)
-0.168***
(0.033)
-0.139***
(0.030)
-0.103***
(0.029)
-0.106***
(0.030)
-0.098***
(0.032)
-0.093***
(0.031)
Effective number of
parties (Laakso-
Taagepera)
-0.062
(0.051)
VARIANCE COMPONENTS (RANDOM PART)
Level: years
σ2v0 (intercept) 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Level: cantons
σ2u0 (intercept) 0.010*
(0.006)
0.005
(0.004)
0.018**
(0.009)
0.015*
(0.008)
0.008
(0.006)
0.008
(0.006)
0.005
(0.005)
0.008
(0.006)
Level: individuals
σ2e (residuals) 3.192***
(0.051)
3.202***
(0.052)
3.190***
(0.051)
3.191***
(0.051)
3.200***
(0.052)
3.193***
(0.051)
3.196***
(0.052)
3.192***
(0.051)
MODEL CHARACTERISTICS
-2*loglikelihood: 31284 30330 31289 31288 30813 31285 29957 31282
No. of years 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
No. of cantons 50 46 50 50 48 50 44 50
No. of individuals 7820 7577 7820 7820 7698 7820 7487 7820
Missing canton NW NW NW NW NW NW NW NW
Excluded cantons AI, NE AI AI, NE,
JU
Notes: The dependent variable is the eleven-point scale for trust in cantonal authorities (0 = no trust; 10 = full
trust). All contextual variables were previously mean centered. The estimates present unstandardized IGLS-
regression coefficients and their standard errors (in parentheses) as computed in MLwiN. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
Source: SELECTS (2003; 2007; 2010) for individual data, Schaub and Dlabac (2012) for democracy measures,
Bundesamt für Statistik (diverse Jahrgänge) and Bundesamt für Statistik and IPW Universität Bern (diverse
Jahrgänge) for other contextual data.
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models for individual institutional trust where each of our four measures of democracy are
considered separately. As our observations are related to only 26 cantons we also check for
the robustness of our findings. By means of bivariate scatterplots on the cantonal share of
‘trusting’ individuals (not reported) we identified the most influencing data-points17 as
outliers to be excluded from analysis.
In all models we find a significant negative effect of the welfare state18, giving at least partial
support to the neo-liberal explanation for low levels of trust. However, in terms of democratic
measures the robust significant negative effect of liberal democracy (model 2) gives strong
support to the radical democratic view that liberal democracy alienates the citizens. We can
also preclude a spurious correlation caused by a larger societal heterogeneity coinciding with
liberal democracy, as the effect remains even when controlling for the effective number of
parties (model 8). Yet claiming that ‘more democracy’ or radical democratic qualities would
cure the ills of present liberal democracies would clearly be exaggerated: There is no single
radical dimension showing significant positive effects on institutional trust. At least we do not
find robust evidence for a similar corrosive effect as was found for liberal democracy.
Table 3 shows our models for individual community support. In contrast the previous models
our ‘Latin culture’ variable as well as our output index of the welfare state remain
insignificant with regard to community support. Instead we find a robust negative effect for
our ‘lean government’ index.19 This result now supports the radical democratic reasoning that
limiting the scope of the state is detrimental to the cultivation of a strong political community
yet we would not want to overstate this interpretation. In terms of democratic measures the
17 |Dfbeta|>0.392 (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 1980).
18 In analogy to our democracy measures we calculated an (neo-Marxist) output index for the welfare state based
on four indicators for the years 2003 and 2007: social expenditures, health expenditures and educational
expenditures (canton and municipalities, per capita; Eidgenössische Finanzverwaltung diverse Jahrgänge); index
for fiscal redistribution (available for 2006 only; Rotzinger 2010). The latter index compares income distribution
before and after tax. Alternatively we found a positive effect for of our (neo-liberal) output index of a lean
government (cf. next footnote), yet the effect was only due to the so called ‘city-cantons’ Basel-Stadt and
Genève (outliers). No effects were found for our (neo-liberal) outcome index of wealth (GDP, growth, full
employment) and for our (neo-Marxist) outcome indices of social justice (income inequality, educational
inequality).
19 The index is based on five indicators: tax revenue, state expenditures and administration expenditures (canton
and municipalities, per capita; Eidgenössische Finanzverwaltung diverse Jahrgänge); public deficit in % of GDP
and public debt per capita. The effect remains significant also when excluding the ‘city-cantons’ Basel-Stadt and
Genève (outliers).
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Table 3. Multilevel models of community support – 25 cantons, 2003 and 2007
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
FIXED PART
Constant (=very attached) -1.227***
(0.135)
-1.203***
(0.136)
-1.239***
(0.137)
-1.229***
(0.137)
-1.226***
(0.136)
-1.204***
(0.137)
-1.216***
(0.134)
Constant (>=rather attached) 1.142***
(0.135)
1.166***
(0.136)
1.127***
(0.137)
1.134***
(0.136)
1.137***
(0.136)
1.161***
(0.137)
1.158***
(0.134)
Constant (>=rather not attached) 3.112***
(0.147)
3.158***
(0.149)
3.094***
(0.149)
3.100***
(0.149)
3.103***
(0.148)
3.150***
(0.150)
3.130***
(0.147)
Reference category (>=not attached at
all)
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL
(common coefficients)
See coefficients of individual variables in table 5.
CONTEXTUAL LEVEL: CANTON
(common coefficients)
Democracy measures (mean values
of last 10 years)
Liberal democracy -0.892***
(0.276)
-0.608**
(0.276)
-0.572*
(0.293)
Radical participation -0.177
(0.294)
Public accountability -0.307
(0.209)
Inclusion -0.743**
(0.292)
-0.305
(0.320)
Political performance
Lean government -0.581**
(0.248)
-0.575**
(0.235)
-0.514*
(0.297)
-0.476*
(0.277)
-0.713***
(0.262)
-0.635**
(0.251)
-1.172***
(0.347)
Controls
Population size (log) -0.199***
(0.054)
-0.179***
(0.052)
-0.311***
(0.053)
-0.282***
(0.048)
-0.233***
(0.052)
-0.214***
(0.051)
-0.161***
(0.053)
Effective number of parties (Laakso-
Taagepera)
-0.195**
(0.084)
VARIANCE COMPONENTS (RANDOM PART)
Level: years
σ2v0 (intercept) 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Level: cantons
σ2u0 (intercept) 0.065***
(0.021)
0.054***
(0.019)
0.082***
(0.025)
0.080***
(0.024)
0.073***
(0.023)
0.061***
(0.021)
0.055***
(0.019)
MODEL CHARACTERISTICS
No. of years 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
No. of cantons 50 46 50 50 50 46 50
No. of individuals 7820 7567 7820 7820 7820 7567 7820
Missing canton NW NW NW NW NW NW NW
Excluded cantons AI, SO AI, SO
Notes: Logit transformed ordered proportional odds model for the four-point scale for attachment to the canton.
All contextual variables were previously mean centered. The estimates present unstandardized PQL-regression
coefficients and their standard errors (in parentheses) as computed in MLwiN. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: SELECTS (2003; 2007; 2010) for individual data, Schaub and Dlabac (2012) for democracy measures,
Bundesamt für Statistik (diverse Jahrgänge) and Bundesamt für Statistik and IPW Universität Bern (diverse
Jahrgänge) for other contextual data.
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picture is the same as before: Liberal democracy turns out as the one robust variable with a
corrosive effect on community support as well.
This corroborating result thus gives us further confidence for stating a general negative effect
of liberal democracy on political support. Whereas in the preceding section we diagnosed a
dilemma of radical democracy due to the empirical trade-off between radical participation and
inclusion, now it is liberal democracy facing a dilemma: Citizens in liberal cantonal
democracies are significantly less supportive of both their political institutions and their
political community.
While to participatory democracies we recommended to improve inclusion by means of
democratic innovations, liberal democracy seems to struggle with its public acceptance. If the
liberal model of democracy is to be maintained, political elites are highly recommended to
look for innovative ways of public accountability and justification which – again – would
involve more accessible forms of public debate (televised democracy) or the selective use of
deliberative mini-publics (Budge 1996; Fuchs 2007; Warren 2009)
7.	Conclusions
Whereas established national and subnational democracies are probably witnessing a
fundamental democratic transformation (Cain, Dalton, and Scarrow 2003), empirical
democracy research is clearly lagging behind with establishing adequate measurement
instruments in order to capture these trends. Pressing questions of democracy research could
therefore be discussed only on a speculative base.
In this paper we thus presented an exemplary multidimensional measurement instrument for
subnational democracies which is capable of assessing democratic transformations, be they
liberal or radical in nature. Moreover, the democratic measures for the Swiss cantons proved
valuable for addressing central questions of democracy research on an empirical base. First,
we demonstrated how these trends led to a higher democratic quality at the subnational level
of the Swiss cantons. Second, we found an empirical trade-off between radical participation
and inclusion, which points to a possible dilemma of radical democracy. Third, the
Jeffersonian dictum of ‘more democracy’ being the cure for the ills of democracy could not be
substantiated in the case of the Swiss cantons. While radical qualities of democracy were of
no harm to political support, they were not conducive to it either. More importantly, liberal
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democracy is now facing a dilemma as it is corrosive to both institutional trust and
community support.
Even if we offered some general ideas of how these two dilemmas could be dissolved,
concrete reform recommendations for the Swiss cantons would need further qualitative
assessments which would take our large amount of data as a starting point. It is also not our
intention to decide whether inclusive liberal democracies with low political support are to be
preferred against exclusive participatory democracies with an average political support.
Instead we suggest that citizens of liberal and radical democracies alike reflect on their
canton’s democratic qualities and its transformative potentials.
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Appendix
Table 4. Short definitions of the indicators used for measuring liberal and radical democracy20
Liberal Constitutionalism
Individual freedom
Freedom rights
- kv_frr_priva Constitutionally guaranteed protection of the privacy sphere
- kv_frr_dign Constitutionally guaranteed protection of human dignity
- kv_frr_life Constitutionally guaranteed right to life, physical and psychic integrity
- kv_frr_info Constitutionally guaranteed freedom of information
- kv_frr_data Constitutionally guaranteed protection against misuse of personal data
- kv_frr_mov Constitutionally guaranteed freedom of movement
- kv_frr_sciart Constitutionally guaranteed right to academic freedom and freedom of art
- kv_frr_fam Constitutionally guaranteed right to marry and to found a family
- kv_frr_opin Constitutionally guaranteed freedom of opinion (building, uttering, propagating, and receiving)
- kv_frr_bel Constitutionally guaranteed freedom of faith, conscience and creed
Property rights
- kv_frr_home Constitutionally guaranteed protection of the sanctities of the home
- kv_frr_est Constitutionally guaranteed freedom of establishment
- kv_frr_prop Constitutionally guaranteed protection of property
- kv_frr_econ Constitutionally guaranteed freedom of trade and occupational choice
- kv_frr_expro Constitutionally guaranteed restrictions to expropriation
Respect for rights and rules
- kv_grr_rel Constitutionally codified duty to respect the rights of others when exercising one’s own basic liberties
- kv_legdut Explicit constitutional codification of everybody‘s obligation to comply with his legal duties
- kv_ordsec Constitutional codification of the state’s responsibility to protect the public security and order
- crime_rate_N Number of convictions under the penal law, per 1000 inhabitants (inverse)
Limited scope of the state
Actual scope
- Staatko_od_N Total public expenditures by canton and municipalities, in CHF per capita (inverse)
- Verko_od_N Cantonal (and municipal) expenditures for general administration and authorities, in CHF per capita (inverse)
- verwdich_ktgem_od_N Public employees of canton and municipalities together, per 100 inhabitants (inverse)
Constitutional provisions
- kv_check Constitutional codification of a continuous assessment of public tasks for their necessity/portability
- kv_budlim Constitutional codification of the principles of a economical and balanced budget management of the state
- kv_finvorb Constitutional codification of conditional financing before adopting new public tasks
- kv_taxhurd Constitutional codification of institutional barriers for tax increases
Rule of law
Supremacy of the law
Formal supremacy of the law
- kv_pr_hear Constitutional codification of a right to a court hearing
- kv_gesvorb Constitutional codification of legal proviso
- kv_retroban Constitutional codification of the prohibition on retroactive legislation
- kv_pr_judgm Constitutional codification of a right for justified court ruling and instruction on the right to appeal
- kv_willkverb Constitutional codification of the prohibition of arbitrariness
Substantive supremacy of the law
- kv_grr_restr Constitutional restrictions of curtailing basic rights
- kv_grrkern Constitutional codification of the inviolability of the core of basic rights
- kv_grrbind Constitutional codification the commitment of public power and individuals to the basic rights
Equality before the law
- kv_pr_fair Constitutional codification of the right for a fair (/and equal) treatment in court hearings
- kv_gratadvice Constitutional codification of the right for a free legal advice
- kv_pr_grat Constitutional codification of the right of deprived people for free legal assistance and legal aid
- kv_diskrverb Explicit constitutional prohibition of discriminating/benefitting certain groups with regard to the equality before the law
- kv_rechtsgl Explicit constitutional codification of a general equality before the law
Protection of minorities
Voting behavior favoring minorities
- MF_Frauen Minority-friendliness of cantonal voting results at national polls regarding women
- MF_Sprachmind Minority-friendliness of cantonal voting results at national polls regarding language minorities
- MF_Alte Minority-friendliness of cantonal voting results at national polls regarding elderly people
- MF_Behinderte Minority-friendliness of cantonal voting results at national polls regarding handicapped people
- MF_Auslaend Minority-friendliness of cantonal voting results at national polls regarding foreigners
- MF_Militaerverweig Minority-friendliness of cantonal voting results at national polls regarding deniers of military service
- MF_Junge_Stimmrecht Minority-friendliness of cantonal voting results at national polls regarding the voting right of younger people
Constitutional provisions
- kv_frr_lang Constitutional guarantee of language freedom
- kv_minprot Constitutional codification of the protection of the rights of minorities
- kv_frr_cohab Constitutional guarantee of the freedom of the form of cohabitation
20 The detailed codebook, the data and a method paper are available upon request (Schaub and Dlabac 2012).
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Horizontal Accountability
Strength of parliament versus government
Independence
- Eröffnung_N Opening of the new legislature period by government (inverse)
- Parlamentsdienst Independent parliamentary secretariat resp. later parliamentary services
- Id_Unver Incompatibility of governmental and parliamentary mandate
Supervisory rights
- Akteneinsicht_AufsKomm Insight in files by inspection commissions
- Inforecht Information right of members of parliament explicitly codified
- Akteneinsicht_allgKomm Inquiry and insight in files by general commissions
- PUK Possibility of inserting a (powerful) parliamentary fact finding commission legally provided
- Konfliktregelung Final decision-making competence in case of conflict between member of parliament and government
Legislative competencies
Legislative competencies of parliament
- Reg_programm Parliament treats government program
- ParlInit Possibility of parliamentary initiative
- Fragestunde Possibility of question time
Legislative competencies of government
- Finanzbefugnisse_N Financial competences of government (inverse)
- Dringlichkeitsrecht_N Right of urgent acts by government (invers)
- Notrecht_N Right in state of emergency by government (inverse)
Power sharing in parliament
Power sharing regulations
- kv_readings Constitutionally defined number of readings before adoption of laws by parliament
- minfrakrel_N Number of members of parliament necessary for building a fraction, in relation to the number of seats in parliament (inverse)
Strength of opposition in parliament
- Oppositionsstaerke Index of effective power of opposition parties versus governing parties in parliament (seat shares)
- CoalitType2 Coalition type of government (minority, surplus majority, minimal winning, hegemonial)
Judicial independence
Separation from government and parliament
- Unvereinbar_KR Incompatibility of mandate at the cantonal high court with parliamentary mandate
- Funktionelle Unabhängigkeit Independence of courts/jurisdiction codified in constitution or law
- Unvereinbar_RR Incompatibility of mandate at the cantonal high court with government mandate
Personal independence
- Unvereinbar_Anwalt Incompatibility of mandate at the cantonal high court with mandate as advocate
- Präsidentenwahl Instance for confirming resp. electing the president of the cantonal high court
- Unvereinbar_VR Incompatibility of mandate at the cantonal high court with an administrative board mandate
- Amtsdauer Term of office of judges at the cantonal high court
- Amtszeitbeschränkung_N Limitation of term of office at the cantonal high court (inverse)
Professionalization
- Eignungsprüfung Instance for controlling ability and eligibility of candidates for the cantonal high court
- Wahlvorbereitung Instance preparing elections
- Aufsichtsorgan Instance of superintendence
Organizational independence
- Budgetrecht Own budget preparation through the courts
- Verwaltungsautonomie Constitutionally or legally codified right of autonomous administration of courts or jurisdiction
- Antragsrecht_Parl Right for applying for finances directly at the parliament
- Anstellung_Kanzlei Appointment of chancellery by highest cantonal court
Îndependent controlling instances
Administrative jurisdiction
- Verwaltungsgericht Administrative court as ultimate authority in disputes concerning administrative law
- Generalklausel Efficacy of administrative court
- VerwaltungsG_Jahre Years since introduction of an administrative court
- Rechtsweggarantie Guaranteed recourse to the cantonal courts also in cases concerning federal administrative law
Constitutional review
- Verfassungsgericht Institutionalized constitutional court
- VerfG_Index Index of powers of courts regarding constitutional review
Agencies of protection
- Ombuds Existence of a cantonal ombudsman
- FK_Umfang Scope of financial control
- kv_fincont Constitutionally guaranteed independence of financial control
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Electoral Accountability
Free elections by secret ballot
- secelec_parl Secret ballot at elections of cantonal parliament
- secelec_reg Secret ballot at elections of cantonal government
Electoral vulnerability of incumbents
Electoral vulnerability in government
- CompRegElec2 Difference between number of candidates and number of mandates in last total renewal elections
- Kampfwahl_Reg More candidates than seats in last total renewal elections
- wett_reg_se 100% minus seat share of strongest party in government
Electoral vulnerability in parliament
- wett_parl2_se_N Difference between largest and second largest party in parliament, in % of all seats (inverse)
- wett_parl_se 100% minus seat share of strongest party in parliament
Electoral availability
- Volatilitaet_se_year Parliamentary volatility: Net change of seat shares of parties, standardized for the length of legislature
- reg_stab2 Change in party composition of government
Clarity of responsibility
- reg_party_N Number of governing parties (inverse)
- spann_N Range of party composition of governing coalition (inverse)
Relative governmental autonomy
Independence from the people between elections
- reglegisl Term of office of government, in years
- parlegisl Term of office in parliament, in years
- Referendumsausschluss No subsequent referendum possible in case of urgent acts, according to constitution
Independence from specific interests
- kv_transpint Constitutional codification of an obligation of members of parliament to disclose interest bonds
- kv_freemand Constitutional codification of a free mandate for members of parliament
Autonomy from other state levels
- transfer_N Total revenues received from the federal state, in CHF per capita (inverse)
- gem_init_ref2_N Right of initiative and referendum for single municipalities on cantonal laws (inverse)
Radical Participation
Extended electoral rights
Electoral rights
- volkwahl Years gone by since the introduction of direct popular election of cantonal executive
- regpraes_volkwahl Election of the executive’s president in popular elections
- Ernennungsbehörde_N Popular elections for the judges of the highest cantonal court
- beratung_wahl Institutionalized opportunity for the citizens to collectively deliberate on elections and candidates
Recall rights
- recall_reg Possibility to recall the cantonal executive from office ahead of time by a popular initiative
- recall_parl Possibility to recall the cantonal parliament from office ahead of time by a popular initiative
Direct-democratic rights
Basic rights of popular initiative and popular referendum
- GIR Index for the institutional openness of the popular statutory initiative, as proposed by Stutzer (1999)
- VIR Index for the institutional openness of the popular constitutional initiative, as proposed by Stutzer (1999)
- GRR Index for the institutional openness of the statutory referendum, as proposed by Stutzer (1999)
- FRR Index for the institutional openness of the fiscal referendum, as proposed by Stutzer (1999)
More refined direct-democratic rights
- verfahrinit_scope Existence and scope of a popular right to propose a different order of votes, postponement of authorities’ projects, and/or
revision of such projects
- beratung_sach Institutionalized opportunity for the citizens to collectively deliberate on the issues put to popular vote
- KRR Index for the existence and institutional openness of the ‘constructive referendum’
Use of direct-democratic rights
- initot Number of popular initiatives put to vote
- reftot Number of referendums put to vote
Local self-rule
Financial and perceived local autonomy
- foed_tax_N Size of municipal as compared to cantonal fiscal revenues
- foed_schreiber Degree of local autonomy as perceived and reported by the heads of municipal administrations
Constitutional local autonomy
- kv_gembest Constitutionally guaranteed right for the existing municipalities to continued existence
- kv_gemaut Constitutional codification of municipal autonomy
- kv_gemfusion Constitutional provisions concerning mergers of municipalities
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Public Accountability
Transparency of political processes
Transparency of parliament and communication by authorities
- kv_vernehml Explicit constitutional codification of the mechanism of consultation
- oeffprinz Legal enactment of the general rule that any governmental documents are freely accessible to the public
- kv_behinfo Constitutionally codified duty of the authorities to inform the public about their activities
- ParlSecretSess_N Provisions concerning the possibility of secret sessions or secret decisions on single agenda items by the parliament (inverse)
- ParlProt Accessibility and elaborateness of the minutes of parliamentary sessions
Transparency of government and courts
- kv_publger Constitutional provisions concerning the public access to judicial proceedings
- kv_publreg Constitutional provisions concerning the public access to government sessions
Media
Media rights
- kv_infodiv Constitutionally codified public task to promote information diversity
- kv_zensverb Constitutional codification of the prohibition of censorship
- kv_medfoerd Constitutionally codified public task to promote media access
Media diversity
- pressdiv Press diversity: Number of newspapers with self-contained, regular reporting on cantonal politics
- presscompdist_ex Degree of press competition within the subcantonal districts
Media use
- Radio Share of survey respondents who use radio broadcasting for their opinion-making
- Zeitung Share of survey respondents who use newspapers for their opinion-making
- Fernsehen Share of survey respondents who use television broadcasting for their opinion-making
Extra-institutional participation
Constitutional protection of extra-institutional participation rights
- kv_frr_demo Constitutionally guaranteed freedom to demonstrate
- kv_frr_pet Constitutionally guaranteed right to petition
- kv_frr_stri Constitutionally guaranteed right to strike
- kv_frr_assoc Constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association
Participative culture
- Mitglied Share of survey respondents who are member of at least one political or economic organization
- Leserbriefe Share of survey respondents who use letters to the editor for their opinion-making
- Interesse Share of survey respondents who state to be very interested in politics
Inclusion
Equal political involvement
Universal and equal right to vote
- stimmalterakt Age required for the right to vote and to elect (inverse)
- passelmin_go_N Age required for the right to be elected into the cantonal executive (inverse)
- lady1 Female suffrage
- Ausl_StiR Existence and scope of suffrage for foreign residents
Equal participation
- T_Bildung_N Disproportionality of actual participation rates between groups of different education levels (inverse)
- T_Qualifikation_N Disproportionality of actual participation rates between groups of different occupational statuses (invers)
- turnout_v Turnout rate in cantonal popular votes
- T_Geschlecht_N Disproportionality of actual participation rates between gender groups (inverse)
Minimal amount of resources
Social rights
- kv_sr_work Constitutionally guaranteed right to paid work
- kv_sr_dwell Constitutionally guaranteed right to housing
- kv_sr_matmin Constitutionally guaranteed rights to a minimal amount of material resources, in case of need to be provided by public funds
- kv_sr_heal Constitutionally guaranteed rights to the protection and advancement of one’s health
Rights to education
- kv_sr_edurights Constitutionally guaranteed right to (adequate) education
- kv_sr_eduquant Constitutionally codified public task to provide several educational services
- kv_sr_eduacc Constitutionally guaranteed right to an equal and easy access to the educational services
- kv_sr_edugrat Constitutionally guaranteed right to education free of charge
Inclusive representation
Electoral system favorable to minorities
- thresho_N Effective threshold to get a seat in the cantonal parliament (inverse)
- proporz3reg Degree of proportionality of the electoral systems for parliamentary and governmental elections
- parlmand Number of seats in the cantonal parliament
Representation of parties in parliament
- rae Rae index of parliamentary party fractionalization
- Gallagher_N Index for the effective disproportionality of the parliamentary electoral system, as proposed by Gallagher (inverse)
Inclusiveness of the governing coalitions
- reg_konk Cumulated vote share (in parliamentary elections) of all parties represented in government
- kommprop Average number of seats in parliamentary committees per party
Proportional representation of socio-structural groups
Proportional representation by gender
- Frauenteil_gov Share of female members in government
- Frauenteil_parl Share of female members in parliament
Proportional representation by age and profession
- Durchschnittsalter_reg_parl_N Average age of the members of government and parliament (inverse)
- disrep_prof_reg_parl_N Disproportionality of the occupational groups‘ representation in government and parliament (inverse)
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Table 5. Individual models of political support – 25 cantons, 2003 and 2007
Institutional trust Community support
FIXED PART FIXED PART
Constant 6.503*** (0.132) Constant (=very attached) -1.091*** (0.142)
Constant (>=rather attached) 1.234*** (0.143)
Constant (>=rather not attached) 3.188*** (0.156)
Reference category (>=not attached at
all)
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL INDIVIDUAL LEVEL (common coefficients)
Political factors Political factors
Electoral loser -0.090** (0.043) Electoral loser -0.063 (0.047)
Left-right self-placement (right) 0.083*** (0.023) Left-right self-placement (right) 0.156*** (0.025)
No frequent participation at national
elections
-0.422*** (0.052) No frequent participation at national
elections
-0.432*** (0.055)
Political knowledge -0.022 (0.021) Political knowledge 0.006 (0.022)
Political interest 0.142*** (0.029) Political interest 0.338*** (0.031)
Performance Performance
Negative evaluation of state of the
economy
-0.336*** (0.028) Negative evaluation of state of the
economy
-0.047 (0.030)
Social capital Social capital
Trust in others 0.131*** (0.009) Trust in others 0.027*** (0.009)
Member of organization or association 0.160*** (0.055) Member of organization or
association
0.134** (0.059)
Cultural values Cultural values
Post-materialist -0.184*** (0.054) Post-materialist -0.279*** (0.057)
Religious denomination Religious denomination
Catholic 0.042 (0.092) Catholic 0.034 (0.098)
Protestant 0.104 (0.092) Protestant 0.196** (0.099)
None -0.244** (0.098) None -0.372*** (0.105)
Other (reference group) Other (reference group)
Church attendance several times a week 0.289*** (0.069) Church attendance several times a
week
0.064 (0.075)
Social status Social status
Does not get along with income -0.331*** (0.080) Does not get along with income -0.172** (0.085)
Residential property -0.112*** (0.043) Residential property 0.037 (0.047)
Level of education -0.024 (0.025) Level of education -0.105*** (0.027)
Demographics Demographics
Age 0.003*** (0.001) Age 0.005*** (0.001)
Female 0.149*** (0.044) Female 0.105** (0.047)
Municipality/agglomeration with more
than 10‘000 residents
0.006 (0.048) Municipality/agglomeration with
more than 10‘000 residents
0.043 (0.051)
Living in canton for more than 10 years -0.001 (0.060) Living in canton for more than 10
years
0.752*** (0.065)
VARIANCE COMPONENTS (RANDOM PART) VARIANCE COMPONENTS (RANDOM PART)
Level: years Level: years
σ2v0 (intercept) 0.000 (0.000) σ2v0 (intercept) 0.000 (0.000)
Level: cantons Level: cantons
σ2u0 (intercept) 0.160*** (0.040) σ2u0 (intercept) 0.175*** (0.044)
Level: individuals Level: individuals
σ2e (residuals) 3.188*** (0.051) σ2e (residuals) -
MODEL CHARACTERISTICS MODEL CHARACTERISTICS
-2*loglikelihood: 31349 -2*loglikelihood: -
No. of years / cantons / individuals 2 / 50 / 7820 No. of years / cantons / individuals 2 / 50 / 7820
Missing canton NW Missings (cantons) NW
Notes: See tables 2 and 3 respectively. The scale for political knowledge and age were mean centered, the other
continuous variables were transformed to normal scores.
